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ABSTRACT: This article undertakes an ideological critique of mathematics education
from a capitalist perspective. By replacing ‘society’ with ‘education’ and ‘the figure of
the Jew’ with ‘mathematics’ in quotations from philosopher Slavoj Žižek, we
characterize mathematics as the symptom of educational ideology. From such
substitutions, we get statements like: Education does not exist and Mathematics is its
symptom. In order to explore the kernel of truth in these statements, we introduce two
concepts: identity-quilted-speech, to specify the so-called certainty of twentieth century
mathematics (M20), and qualified-labor-power, to characterize the commodity that
results from school production. Through the development of these concepts, we show
how M20 actualizes Kant’s radical ethics. We indicate the need to consider the
mathematics classroom from the sociological perspective of jouissance. We present three
instances of the inescapable production of meaning imposed on us by what we call the
juggernaut of capitalist society. This inescapable production leaves us no apparent
alternative but to either become a devotee of Capital or to follow the path of the Great
Refusal: a re-signification of terrorism. Against this dead-end alternative, we suggest
ways of decelerating the juggernaut, trying to curb it from within our classrooms.
Key words: Production of Meaning; Evaluation and Promotion; Qualified Labor Power;
Ideology of Education; Capitalism and Terrorism.

1

rrbaldino@terra.com.br

The Mathematics Enthusiast, ISSN 1551-3440, vol. 15, nos. 1&2, pp. 178 - 200
2018 © The Author(s) & Dept. of Mathematical Sciences-The University of Montana

TME, vol. 15, nos. 1&2, p. 179

Introduction
By simply looking around, we can immediately recognize how Capital-driven technology
determines our reality. We become more and more dependent on a generalized ritual
where technology-loaded gadgets determine the meaning of everything we do. These
gadgets become signifiers; we cannot use them without producing meaning. There is no
‘breathing space’ for ceasing to be meaningful.
For instance, while you are thinking whether you should insert a five-dollar bill
into a vending machine to get a sandwich, you still do not exist for Capital. As soon as
you press the button, you produce yourself as meaning: you are a consumer and, as such,
you are expected to automatically behave according to certain laws. Even your way of
walking is meaningful. Consumers have no breathing space; production of nonsense
becomes unfeasible. Furthermore, even doing nothing may be meaningful, as the
following paragraph indicates.
Imagine a vending machine equipped with a camera (or the like) that registers
people standing in front of it, walking by, etc. In such a situation, even these "noninteractions" with the machine can be fraught with meaning. The machine could save
information such as how many people passed by, how many stopped, for how many
seconds people stopped in front of the machine, etc. Once in a while, the machine could
change its color, its display of advertisement, or the like. This could then be used e.g. to
search for patterns in the data in order to determine how much the machine needs to
capture the person’s attention to ensure that she will make a purchase. Standing in front
of a vending machine without buying yields a surplus value that is yet to be explained. 2
Lacan would say that the appearance of the subject in front of the machine is the
first, or unary signifier that represents the subject to another signifier, in this case, to
Capital. This second signifier produces the aphanisis of the subject, in this case her
reduction to a consumer. “Hence the division of the subject – when the subject appears
somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading’, as disappearance” (Lacan
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This paragraph is a contribution of Hauke Straehler-Pohl.
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1978, p. 218). Commenting on Descartes’s cogito, ergo sum, Lacan stresses the mismatch
between thinking and being: “I think where I am not, hence I am where I do not think”
(Lacan 1966, p.277).
In one word, capitalism leaves no room for the old and trustworthy ‘free will’.
Our conclusion is that the impossibility of a nonsensical action produces the sensation
that we are acting out pre-established roles that are only fulfilled when we think that we
have managed to avoid them. All-pervading meaning nullifies us into “shallow
mechanical dolls” (Butler et al. 2000, p.134) and life becomes a deep permanent
certainty of déjà vu. At the end of his book with J. Butler and E. Laclau, Žižek indicates
the alternative to this political capture of the subject at the most intimate level: “My
point, of course, is that today’s ‘mad dance’, the dynamic proliferation of multiple
shifting identities, also awaits its resolution into a new form of Terror” (Butler et al.
2000, p. 326). We suggest that the resignification of Terrorism asked for by Žižek is the
Great Refusal to the constraints resulting from all pervasive capitalist meaning.
We call such automatism of meaning the juggernaut of capitalism and consider it
from the point of view of mathematics education. Through a parody of a text by Žižek,
we suggest that mathematics is to school what the ‘figure of the Jew’ is to society,
namely, a symptom of failure. Mathematics’ and ‘the figure of the Jew’ enter this parody
as rigid designators, that is, meaningless signifiers whose function is to assign unity to
ideological fields. To surpass the theoretical deficiency of the rigid designator, we make
precise what we understand by ‘mathematics’: a historical form of speech that we call
twentieth century mathematics (M20) and that we show to be a metaphysical language
convention. This is the speech that we are expected to teach in our classrooms; we should
be aware of its consequences.
We present three situations where the juggernaut of capitalism fait ravage among
people’s expectation of carrying out free will actions. We argue that the capitalist
production of meaning in schools rests upon a resilient Borromean knot uniting three
main school practices: teaching of M20, the credit system and economic qualification of
labor-power. To oppose this capitalist production of meaning we suggest three possible
actions that we can carry out from inside our classrooms, each of them founded on
cutting one of the Borromean knot connections. Of course, global consequences can only
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become effective through a large political educational movement that collimates the
infinitesimal effect produced by each of us. Nevertheless, even if such movement never
occurs, our ethical action may exempt us from the dead-end choice between capitalism
and terrorism.
Educational ideology, mathematical symptom and mathematics education fantasy
We take for granted Althusser’s description of the ideology of current education and the
massive presence of mathematics education in schools. Although they do not say it,
Lundin & Christensen (2017) and Straehler-Pohl (2017) show that mathematics is a
symptom of current educational ideology. Indeed, by suggesting that imaginary gadgets
used in socially significant problems have built-in or “frozen” mathematical properties,
Straehler-Pohl (2017) brings mathematics to the center of meaning production in school.
However, social relations perceived as properties of things is what Marx indicates as the
phantasm of commodity and Lacan calls a symptom. We thus infer that mathematics is a
symptom of the current ideology of education.
Furthermore, Straehler-Pohl (2017) proposes to legitimize a space for students
within the mathematics classroom and to reject the demand to solve problems of social
significance by means of mathematics. Lundin and Christensen (2017) focus on the
ambivalent attachment to mathematics, where people learn to love and hate it
simultaneously. From this, we infer that mathematics emerges as the symptom of
affectivity that hampers school functioning. By showing us this limit point, these authors
accomplish an important delineation of the jouissance3 kernel of educational ideology,
allowing us to develop this study.
In order to analyze this symptom we will employ an unorthodox method: we
make a parody, copying a text of Žižek and replacing some signifiers. We propose an
exercise: make the substitutions and read the parody. The substitutions are not arbitrary,
but their adequacy can only be justified a posteriori. Our purpose is to suggest that

The French term jouissance transcends the English ‘enjoyment’ insofar as it contains sexual connotations
and opens up the possibility of sadistic ‘enjoyment’.
3
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mathematics is to the failure of education just as 'the figure of the Jew’ is to the failure of
the totalitarian project of reaching a 'harmonious society', exempt from class antagonism.
Perhaps a common unconscious drive is present in both situations.
Here is an example where we have made what will be our two main replacements:
‘society’ with ‘education’ and ‘the figure of the Jew’ with ‘mathematics’. Where Žižek
writes: “To put it bluntly: ‘Society doesn’t exist and the Jew is its symptom” (Žižek 1999,
p. 125), we make: “To put it bluntly: Education doesn’t exist and Mathematics is its
symptom”. The development of the preceding paragraph leads us to substitute ‘antiSemitism’ by ‘anti-mathematics’, a radical proposal to solve the dilemma ‘love school,
hate mathematics’ (Lundin 2011). After each piece of parody, we will reproduce Žižek’s
original text in a footnote. We will distinguish the parodies using a different (Calibri
light) font. From page 125 mentioned above we make:
On the level of discourse analysis, it is not difficult to articulate the network of symbolic
overdetermination invested in Mathematics. First, there is displacement: the basic trick of
anti-mathematics is to displace educational differentiation into differentiation between
the sound educational texture, educational body, and Mathematics as the force corroding
it, the force of disruption. Thus, it is not education itself which is ‘impossible’, based on
differentiation – the source of disruption is located in a particular entity, Mathematics.4

To show how this displacement is possible, Žižek enumerates a series of
deleterious associations with the figure of the Jew. It is not difficult to find similar
associations with mathematics. Mathematics is supposed to be difficult, to be not for all,
class distinguishing, anguish producing, useless for real life, an ordeal for children and
youths, etc. The substitutions that we have made in the next paragraph will be justified

4

On the level of discourse analysis, it is not difficult to articulate the network of symbolic
overdetermination invested in the figure of the Jew. First, there is displacement: the basic trick of antiSemitism is to displace social antagonism into antagonism between the sound social texture, social body,
and the Jew as the force corroding it, the force of corruption. Thus, it is not society itself which is
‘impossible’, based on antagonism – the source of corruption is located in a particular entity, the Jew.
(Žižek 1999:125).
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below, when we deal with school and economy. From page 123, always of the same
Žižek’s text, we get the following.
This displacement is made possible by the association of Mathematics with economic
value. The source of failure and of competition is located not in the basic relation
between students and the credit system but between the ‘productive’ forces (‘good’
students, teachers and staff) and slower learners, cheaters and profiteers that exploit the
‘productive’ classes replacing organic cooperation with competition.5

The ideology of education does not ‘see’ that the credit system imposes
differentiation; it keeps the hope to teach all and attributes failure to external contingent
factors.
This displacement is, of course, supported by condensation: mathematics condenses
opposing features, features associated with failure and success: mathematics is supposed
to be for all and distinguishing, useless and empowering, excluding and promoting. 6

Up to this point, the analysis of ideology has remained in the level of discourse.
According to Žižek, essays on Althusser’s theory of ideology have limited themselves to
the level of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, forgetting the Real of jouissance.
Continuing with Žižek’s text, we complete the analysis of educational ideology in the
realm of enjoyment. In page 126, we replace ‘fantasy’ with ‘mathematics education’ and
‘sexual relation’ with ‘mathematics for all’ to get:
But this logic of metaphoric-metonymic displacement is not sufficient to explain how
Mathematics captures our desire: to penetrate its fascinating force, we must take into
account the way ‘Mathematics’ enters the framework of fantasy structuring our
enjoyment. Mathematics education is basically a scenario filling out the empty space of a

5

This displacement is made possible by the association of Jews with financial dealings: the source of
exploitation and of class antagonism is located not in the basic relation between working and ruling classes
but between the ‘productive’ forces (workers, organizers of production…) and the merchants who exploit
the ‘productive’ classes, replacing organic cooperation with class struggle (Žižek 1999, p. 125).
6
This displacement is, of course, supported by condensation: the figure of the Jew condenses opposing
features, features associated with lower and upper classes: Jews are supposed to be dirty and intellectual,
voluptuous and impotent, and so on (Žižek 1999, p. 125-6).
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fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void. ‘There is no mathematics for all’ and
this impossibility is filled out by the fascinating fantasy-scenario – that is why
mathematics education is, in the last resort, always a fantasy of the mathematics for all, a
staging of it.7

Surprisingly, this last paragraph is almost a rephrasing of contentions expressed in
the articles of Pais (2012, 2014, 2017). Still from page 126, we get the following.
It is now clear how we can use this notion of mathematics education in the domain of
education proper: here also there is no class relationship, education is always traversed
by a differential split which cannot be integrated into symbolic order. And the stake of
education-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of education which does exist, an
education which is not split by a differential division, an education in which the relation
between its parts is organic, complementary.8

In this second part of the analysis, Žižek seeks to demonstrate how jouissance
captures us, but he falls short. Our parody will help. ‘School’ enters here as a replacement
for ‘factual society’. From page 126:
How then do we take account of the distance between this corporatist vision and school,
split by differential competition? The answer is, of course, Mathematics: an external
element, a foreign body introducing disruption into the sound educational fabric. In short,
‘Mathematics’ is a fetish which simultaneously denies and embodies the structural

7

But this logic of metaphoric-metonymic displacement is not sufficient to explain how the figure of the
Jew captures our desire: to penetrate its fascinating force, we must take into account the way “Jew’ enters
the framework of fantasy that structures our enjoyment. Fantasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty
space of a fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void. ‘There is no sexual relationship’, and this
impossibility is filled out by the fascinating fantasy-scenario – that is why fantasy is, in the last resort,
always a fantasy of the sexual relationship, a staging of it (Žižek 1999, p. 126).
8
It is now clear how we can use this notion of fantasy in the domain of ideology proper: here also ‘there is
no class relationship’, society is always traversed by an antagonistic split which cannot be integrated into
symbolic order. And the stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of a society that does
exist, a society which is not split by an antagonistic division, a society in which the relation between its
parts is organic, complementary (Žižek 1999, p. 126).
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impossibility of Education. It is as if in Mathematics, this impossibility had acquired a
positive, palpable existence.9

Here Žižek does not show how jouissance emerges. In our parody, jouissance
emerges in the field of educational ideology insofar as some people identify themselves
with the symptom: they strive to learn mathematics and some become mathematicians;
they enjoy imposing a special kind of speech; as teachers, they appreciate those who can
repeat this speech, they enjoy reproducing their own caste; they enjoy imposing hardship
on young people, etc. However, we show that the disaffection towards mathematics, felt
as a ‘burden’ or ‘hardship’, is due to the action of people immersed in the social
contradictions of education, not to an intrinsic property of mathematics ‘frozen’ in
gadgets.
Our parody has a counterpart in the wider social range. Even in societies not
necessarily subjected to anti-Semitic ideology, a form of jouissance emerges when some
people unconsciously identify with the 'figure of the Jew'. They actually do, in their
everyday lives, most of what they execrate in the negative stereotype of this figure, which
Charles Dickens described well in Oliver Twist; they only cover it up with a discrete
bourgeois charm10. These people abide by un-confessable capitalist values. Only now can
we conclude with Žižek: “the positive palpable existence of the 'figure of the Jew'
(mathematics) marks the eruption of enjoyment (jouissance) in the social (educational)
field” (126).
Up to this point, we have completed the interplay between two signifiers:
‘education’ and ‘mathematics’. Our parodies indicate directions of research.
Nevertheless, according to Žižek, to complete the analysis of ideology we must also
establish the meaning of the symptom: In short, it can easily be shown how Mathematics

9

How then do we take account of the distance between this corporatist vision and the factual society split
by antagonistic struggles? The answer is, of course, the Jew: an external element, a foreign body
introducing corruption into the sound social fabric. In short, ‘Jew’ is a fetish that simultaneously denies and
embodies the structural impossibility of 'Society’: it is as if in the figure of the Jew, this impossibility had
acquired a positive, palpable existence (Žižek 1999, p. 126).
10
Consider, for instance, the great juridical operations, Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) in Italy (1992-96) and
Lava Jato (Car Wash) that started in 2014 in Brazil and is still underway.
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is a symptom in the sense of a coded message, a cypher, a disfigured representation of
educational differentiation; by undoing this work of displacement/condensation, we can
determine its meaning.11
Fantasy is not to be interpreted, only traversed, to find out that there is nothing
behind it except pulsating drive. On the contrary, for the analysis of ideology, Žižek
requires the interpretation of the symptom, the determination of its meaning. “There is a
lot behind a symptom, a whole network of symbolic overdetermination, which is why the
symptom involves its interpretation” (Žižek 1999, p. 126). Therefore, it becomes
necessary to surpass the level of rigid designators and specify what should ‘mathematics’
as the signifier of a symptom mean in the context of mathematics education.
Meaning of mathematics as symptom of education: M20
Taking the signifier ‘mathematics’ as it appears in mathematics education texts,
we see that its meaning is undefined. The only consensus around the question ‘what is
mathematics?’ seems to be that whatever the answer may be, it hampers neither teaching,
nor research on mathematics education, much less production of mathematics itself. For a
comprehensive treatment of this question, see Gold (2016).
‘Mathematics’ as a common sense signifier is what Žižek (1999) calls a rigid
designator; it is not a point of “supreme density of meaning”; on the contrary, it “totalizes
an ideology by bringing to a halt the metonymic slide of its signified” (99). It is
astonishing that such a huge market has been developed, flourishes and nourishes
scientific ambitions around an undefined object of study whose meaning coincides with
the act of enunciating its name. The result is a realm of discourse sharply contrasting with
the absolute certainty attributed to its so-called results. Under the ideology of
improvement, people “eschew research from a critical analysis of its own role in the
creation of the very same gap that it so eagerly strives to close” (Pais 2017, p. 54).

11

In short, it can easily be shown that the figure of the Jew is a symptom in the sense of a coded message, a
cypher, a disfigured representation of social antagonism; by undoing this work of
displacement/condensation, we can determine its meaning (Žižek 1999, p. 125-6).
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We understand M20 as the result of the millenary effort to introduce the
possibility of quilting points throughout speeches in order to detain the sliding of the
signified under the signifier. Quilting point is a concept introduced by Lacan, evoking the
making of mattresses: the quilting point (point de capiton) is the stitch that transforms a
sack into a cushion, with two sides, say, 1 and 2.
You find this quilting point in the diachronic function of the phrase insofar as it (the
phrase) only fastens its signification with its last term, each term being anticipated in the
construction of the others and inversely, sealing their meaning by its retroactive effect
(Lacan 1971, p. 165, our translation).

Let us give an example of ‘certainty’ in M20 to clarify what we are saying. In a
calculus class for engineering students, the statement: ‘a car with zero speed stands still’
is a self-evident truth. These meanings belong to side 1 of the cushion, where the
polysemy resides. However, M20 does not aim at this kind of certainty, neither is it the
certainty that we are expected to teach at all school levels. Instead, M20 states that ‘a
function with zero derivative is constant’ and proves it by a theorem. Through
definitions, M20 assigns new meanings to familiar signifiers like ‘continuous’.
Definitions are the stitches that lead from side 1 to side 2, opening a completely new
universe of meaning.
Once we pass through the quilting point of one of these signifiers, all the others
acquire the interconnected meanings they have on side 2 and the corresponding signifiers
of side 1 are reduced to metonyms of those of side 2. Side 2 is the side of M20. The
quilting point does not come necessarily at the end of the sentence. The first reading of
the theorem may make no sense and a second reading may provide quilting at any point.
This diachronic operation has the retroactive effect of leading people to think that, in
M20, meaning is a synchronic function established beforehand. Mathematicians
communicate through these metonyms of side 1; they look like they are talking about our
familiar objects, but they know that their meaning is on side 2. When two of them discuss
a joint work in front of a white-board and, at a certain moment, one of them hesitates and
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says: ‘I see what you mean…’, at this moment a signifier is being pulled from side 1 onto
side 212. Teaching M20 is teaching this double form of speech.
Since Cauchy, definitions have a special form: ‘one says that’ (on dit que). This
‘on dit que’ was a major turning point in the development of quilting speeches. It allowed
mathematics to become free from the obligation of describing the world. The ontology
ceased to be a priori; it must be developed from constitutive definitions. Through this
convention of language, mathematics surpassed the criticism of Berkeley13 and became
autonomous. Here we are at the ground level of the so-called exclusion by mathematics:
if you do not abide by such language conventions, you are out, no matter how much you
‘spin and burn’ (Lundin & Christensen 2017) in your study hours.
A convention of language (on dit que) postulates the identity of two meanings: on
dit que A is A, both meanings are the same; the meaning of one sentence on side 1 is
identical to the meaning of the other on side 2: A=A. We say that this is a speech quilted
via identity of meanings, an identity-quilted-speech. This is what ‘rigor’ means in
reference to M20. If we look for the proof of the mentioned theorem in a calculus
manual, we are driven back repeatedly, until the author evokes knowledge outside the
scope of the book; we have to believe it. In mathematics education, the whole attempt of
M20 to establish a higher degree of certainty about daily life ends in faith.
In addition to the language convention introduced by Cauchy, a second crucial
point has determined the present level of certainty. M20 established its ultimate ontology
when the objects it deals with were finally reduced to natural numbers. In 1924, Bertrand
Russell said something like: on dit que a real number is a half-line of rational numbers
(Boyer 1949, p. 293). However, M20 does not tell us what whole numbers are; it only
establishes their minimal properties, the so-called ‘axioms of Peano’. For M20, ‘number’
is nothing more than a rigid designator. Hilbert proposed to search for the ultimate
quilting point, the ground level of all certainty. However, in 1935 Gödel showed that this

12

Collapse of the wave function in quantum mechanics terminology.
Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) was a philosopher who fiercely criticized the lack of foundation of
Newton's and Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus as having less solid ground than faith.
13
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is not possible, because the paradox of the liar can be stated within arithmetic, i.e. in
terms of whole numbers. Arithmetic itself is not free from paradoxes. Our conclusion is
that M20 is metaphysics based on language conventions.
Higher qualified-labor-power visits publishers
In one way or another, the entire mathematics education movement expects us to improve
the teaching of such language conventions while working under conditions imposed by
capitalism. From an economic point of view, it is not difficult to understand that schools
produce qualified-labor-power, a commodity that circulates as any other, has a market
price, etc. (Baldino & Cabral 2013). Part of this production returns to school as the work
power of teachers and staff. However, any commodity requires adequate measures from
its owners in order to preserve or increase its value. If a commodity drops out of the
circulation of Capital, it loses its value. Qualified-labor-power does not escape this fate. It
constrains its owners to care for a well-appreciated professional or academic career.
Lundin and Christensen (2017) provide us with an opportunity to discuss this issue:
Consider the norms of research. They say that you should write and publish; they specify
the form of your writing and often even what you should write about. Our shield, in this
case, might consist of a steady stream of formally impeccable academic achievements,
demonstrating that we are in fact objectively speaking, doing proper research. (…) Under
this formal surface, however, we may very well think more freely than the publications
suggest (24).

In other places, these authors seem to suggest that, since the ideological
interpellation is never complete, we can somehow evade it: “We can disagree with norms
as we please insofar as this does not disturb our ‘show’ of adherence. Acting as if putting
up a shield of superficial practical compliance can be called norm evading” (ibid., 25).
Also in Straehler-Pohl (2017) we find indications that the ideological interpellation
would leave a door open to refusal: “In order to work effectively, ideology even requires
people not to believe in the social fantasies they are performing” (48). However, Žižek
has thoroughly challenged such hope for freedom.
This apparent failure of interpellation, its self-relating disavowal – the fact that I, the
subject, experience the innermost kernel of my being as something which is not ‘merely
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that’ (the materiality of rituals and apparatuses) is the ultimate proof of its success; of the
fact that the ‘effect-of-subject’ really took place (Butler et al., 134, original emphasis).

Following Žižek, hopes of freedom indicate the completion of an ‘effect-ofsubject’. We have an example of the nature of the ideological interpellation that produces
this effect whenever an author visits an editor. We took the above quotation from a
commodity that, like any book, has received investment from a publishing house. The
circulation of the book-commodity in the market must at least preserve the value of the
authors’ qualified-labor-power, as well as the reputation and economic maintenance of
the publishing house, its make value.
Of course no editor would say ‘I need your paper to make profit’ and no author
would say ‘I must publish to increase the value of my labor power’. If the editor and the
authors consciously and publicly assumed this speech they would be playing the role of
Brechtian characters in real life: quite impossible. Our argument presupposes that, in face
of the mention that their contract involves these economic values, authors and publisher
would protest, perhaps in Žižek’s terms: ‘we are not merely that’.
Of course, they cannot be ‘merely that’; the “crucial dimension of the ideological
effet-sujet” is “not in my direct identification with the symbolic mandate (such direct
identification is potentially psychotic; it turns me into a ‘shallow mechanical doll’, not
into a ‘living person’)” (Butler et al. 2000, 134). The effet-sujet is the feeling that I am an
autonomous Ego (Lacan 1991, p. 83) that pre-exists the process of interpellation and can
freely decide when to obey it. Therefore, when authors and editors say ‘we are not merely
that’, they find a ‘breathing space’ that allows each one to “identify his own lack with the
lack in the Other” (Žižek 1999, p. 122). Capital smiles, satisfied: its conditions for
reproduction have been reproduced.
Here we must quote Sohn-Rethel (1978). “A capitalist enterprise may survive a
lowering of its profits and even a temporary lack of profits in a general slump, but if the
automatism of the labor process breaks down, the very basis of the production relation of
capitalism is in jeopardy” (122). The necessity to maintain the process of production in
operation is what Sohn-Rethel calls the ‘postulate of automatism’: “a condition for the
Capital control over production is even more vital than its economic profitability” (ibid).
We apply this postulate to mathematics education. The attempts to improve mathematics
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teaching are precisely the excess of order that allows the proliferation of disordersustaining production: “publishing, teaching, funding and researching (to conferences,
project meetings and the like)” (Straehler-Pohl et al. 2017, p. 3). In short, production in
mathematics education becomes more important than the quality of its product.
The question that remains is not why and how capitalism transforms its criticism
into profit and success as it did to Pink Floyd (1979), an exemplary case. The question is:
can an effective criticism of capitalism circulate as a commodity? This is a side question
of the present essay. We will return to it in the last paragraph of this article, following the
suggestion of a colleague14, and apply our criticism to ourselves.
Jouissance and Kant’s radical ethics
“How is it possible to reduce or eliminate all the pathological motives or incentives of
our actions?” (Zupančič 2000, p. 15). Of course this is a rhetorical question; nevertheless,
the school system apparently endeavors to answer it.

When grading an exam,

mathematics teachers are supposed to “disregard all self-interest, ignore the ‘pleasure
principle’ and all concern with her own well-being” (ibid). They should concentrate on
the written document produced by the student, under the point of view of language
convention defined by M20. Is this possible? “What kind of a monstrous, ‘inhuman’
subject does Kantian ethics presuppose?”(ibid). Lacan warns us that what is foreclosed
from the symbolic emerges as symptom in the Real. Let us see how this happens.
Why do we make children ‘spin and burn’ (Lundin & Christensen 2017) in the
mathematics classroom to impose a kind of certainty that either depends on faith or runs
into paradoxes? The answer is that M20 provides us with a disclaimer that assures the
smooth functioning of the credit system. As mathematics teachers, we are supposed to
assume that certainty of M20 is reliable in all cases, like a Kantian “categorical
imperative” (Zupančič 2000, p. 60) and that the social function of institutionalized
schooling is the “legitimate distribution of pupils to future professions” (Gellert 2017, p.
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76). In short, we enter our classrooms under the interpellation of legitimate allocation
grounded on absolute certainty.
We can deceive ourselves believing that the promotion called ‘evaluation’ is a
ready-made duty established before our arrival in the situation so that we can act without
assuming any responsibility for it. This position is untenable; as mathematics teachers,
we made a choice for this kind of duty somewhere in the past, informed by our
participation in the process from our past role as students. Even when duty is inscribed in
tables like the Ten Commandments, “it is the subject who makes something his duty, and
has to answer for it” (Zupančič 2000, p. 59).
The credit system assures that we cannot promote some without creating hurdles
for others; we cannot love promotion and hate exclusion. We derive our surplus
jouissance from the selective process itself and not only from promotion, which means
that part of our jouissance comes from exclusion. We can apply the disclaimer, which
Zupančič (2000) calls our first self-deception and say “I am sorry if my action hurts you,
but I only did what the Other (or Duty or the Law) wanted me to do, so go and talk to It if
you have any objections” (58). However, we remain responsible by what we refer to as
duty and, worse than that, “the type of discourse where I use my duty as an excuse for my
actions is perverse in the strictest sense” (ibid).
This is not overly disquieting; perversion may well be an option when the smooth
functioning of the school apparatus is at stake. Of course, the students may also enjoy
participating in defense of the school: for them the process reserves the option of a
masochist jouissance. However, the mathematics teachers rely on a second self-deception
disclaimer. Suppose we ask teachers and staff precisely where the so-called ‘exclusion’ is
occurring in their school, “They would point to the high number of students in front of
them, they would point to the lack of qualified support and they would point to the social
background of many of the students” (Gellert 2017, p. 78). Of course, mathematics
teachers will never point to the certainty of M20 as a categorical imperative that “can be
written in some master list of commandments valid for all future generations” (Zupančič,
2000, p. 60). Therefore, they deceive themselves regarding the part of our jouissance that
comes from exclusion.
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It is not ‘mathematics’ itself that imposes ‘ordeal on children and youths’ (Lundin
& Christensen 2017). Failure does not have to be materially present; it suffices to keep it
lurking on the horizon. The ordeal has to do with the feeling of lagging behind peers who
are ‘good in math’ and the feeling of supporting a bit of their sadistic jouissance,
suggesting that we are a hopeless mathematical case. When the credit system uses M20
as a “gatekeeping dispositive” (Boistrup 2017) the school affords the student the
possibility of a kind of masochist jouissance. Of course, students respond differently to
this affordance. Some love it, most hate it. Some may identify themselves with the
symptom of educational ideology and enjoy the exercise of power sanctioned by M20 to
justify the capture of work of those who ‘fail’, or, according to the euphemism, to justify
the school’s ‘allocation’ function of students to lesser professions as a legitimate one.
With stalwart resilience, the school sets the stage to keep this sadistic/masochist
kind of jouissance as a possibility in the production of qualified-labor-power. We suggest
research be done in the mathematics classroom from the perspective of jouissance,
amounting to what we could call the sociology of mathematics jouissance. Werner
Heisenberg (1971) and Hermann Hesse (1943) both tell us the stories of an idyllic time
when the use-value of qualified-labor-power was paramount with respect to its
institutionalized exchange-value. At that time, it mattered less what degrees one had than
what one knew and could do. Discovery dominated the jouissance of researchers. Carl
Djerassi (1963) tells us what happened to this jouissance since qualified-labor-power
started being produced for the sake of the market: the possibility of prizes like the Nobel
Prize started dominating the scene. These authors deliciously describe how ethics
becomes a “jouissance of duty” with simultaneous production of subject and universality.
In several points of their description, reality and fantasy coalesce.
Nevertheless, Borovik (2016) reports a personal case of a very different situation
where the market of qualified-labor-power was absent in the old Soviet Union. He was
free to create and grow. Asimov (1957) only exaggerates a little, depicting a fully
planned society where the state took up the selection of people for different professions,
including the distinction of people with high creative abilities who were not assigned to
any profession and were free to do whatever they wanted, while supported by the state.
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In Baldino and Cabral (2013) we made an exercise in Marxist rigor and looked at
school from the economic point of view. For a similar exercise in rigor, see Pais (2016).
Other authors, like Swanson (2017) also consider schools from this point of view and
recognize that “certificates do potentially influence the future exchange rate of the
commodity labor power for those holding them” (236). From an economic viewpoint,
Neander (1974) reports the development of school in Germany from the Middle Ages to
the sputnik shock.
We can now increment our 2013 (Baldino & Cabral 2013) answer to this question
posed by Althusser. “Why is the educational apparatus in fact the dominant Ideological
State Apparatus (ISA) in capitalist social formations, and how does it function?”
(Althusser 1970, p. 93). The educational apparatus becomes the dominant one in capitalist
society because in school, the student learns, above all, to participate in and enjoy the
conditions of production and seizure of surplus-value, the work done by one’s fellow
classmates. Through the experience of mathematics 'jouissance', school sets up the
production of the capitalist dominant male. The association of M20 with the credit system
allows capitalism to accomplish “the ‘ethical transubstantiation’ required by Kant’s view:
the question of the possibility of converting a mere form into a material efficacious drive”
Zupančič (2000, p. 15). In other words, school transubstantiates allocation grounded on
absolute M20 certainty into ' jouissance' from fulfillment of the economic law. It is hard to
think of a more important condition that the juggernaut would require be imparted on the
devotees of capitalism.
The Borromean knot
Articulation of school practices grants the smooth driving of the juggernaut towards
production of meaning. Teaching of M20, credit system selection and production of
qualified-labor-power are tied together by a kind of Borromean knot in such a way that
attempts to isolate the contribution of any of these practices to the production of meaning
are immediately nullified by conductors of the juggernaut. For instance, Pais (2012)
denounces the production of meaning in these three practices, without enlacing them with
the knot. Therefore, Gellert (2017) is free to slide the signified under the signifiers: the
‘credit system’ becomes a legitimate allocation function of school, ‘M20 is not for all’
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becomes various “mathematical knowledge to be transmitted to different groups of
students” (69) and economical selection becomes access to socially powerful positions.
Thereby, the criticism contained in Pais’ aphorism is finally tamed and pulled back into
order, and the juggernaut proceeds smoothly. The resilience of the Borromean knot is due
to its connections, not to the inertia of its separate elements.
We state the Borromean knot in an aphorism whose terms require each other to
have meaning: M20 is not for all because the credit system obstructs 'jouissance' by
applying M20 criteria. Keeping this aphorism in mind, we draw the following diagram.

Credit system
Selection

2
Qualified-L-P
Economy

1
M20
Certainty

3

Figure 1. The Borromean knot
Connection 1: School standardizes the qualified labor power into strata and determines
the M20 exchange-value of each strata. The economic value of the qualified-labor-power
produced assures individual interest on the stability of this process.
Connection 2: The credit system distinguishes (allocates) people into professions of
different salaries, producing qualified-labor-power of different values. M20 assures that
this distinction is based on reliable and precise measure of acquired knowledge.
Connection 3: M20 is an ability to be imparted upon people in order to distinguish them
according to the use-value of their qualified labor power. The credit system assures that
this assignment empowers each one according to his/her capability.
If capitalism is indeed a juggernaut that deprives people of any possible
alternative other than the Great Refusal, perhaps we can find a way to stop it by more
efficient means than exploding ourselves and taking together as many as we can with us.
There is no exteriority to capitalism to provide us with a fulcrum on which to apply a
lever of change. Whatever we can do will only be efficient from our function as social
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agents, during our class time and research activities. If our analysis is correct, to stop the
juggernaut we must cut the Borromean knot. If we cannot stop the capitalist production
of meaning, perhaps we can try to minimize our contribution to it. We suggest three
distinct paths of action, each cutting one of the connections of the Borromean knot.
Cutting connection 1: Suppress the guarantee provided by the economy, suppress the
production and appropriation of surplus-value, keep M20 and keep the credit system, but
differentiate evaluation from promotion and change the promotion criterion: do not let
promotion depend on measures or assessment of acquired M20 knowledge; instead,
decide promotion according to the students’ efforts while working cooperatively. Let
each student collect only the amount of abstract social work spent by him/herself during
school time. Eliminate the surplus-value.
Cutting connection 2: Suppress M20. Keep the credit system and keep the economic
production of qualified-labor-power, but find another meaning to the rigid designator
‘mathematics’: "anything that addresses the status of mathematical knowledge should be
legitimately considered as school mathematics” (Straehler-Pohl 2017, p. 50). Let school
allocate or select people into professions of different economic values, but subtract from
all promotional judgments any guarantee provided by M20; in particular, suppress the
Kantian ethics from all judgments of pass/not pass.
Cutting connection 3: Suppress the credit system, let people approach M20 to the extent
each person desires. Suppress the judicial function of the state in education, ensure that
all students will pass with equal grades, let the classroom be a meeting place for people
who want to improve the use-value of their qualified-labor-power and suppress
certificates. In one word, rebuild the situation prevailing in the Soviet Union, delightfully
described, for instance, by Borovik’s (2016): school in absence of a qualified-laborpower market.
Of course, individual radical application of any of these possibilities leads directly
to the subject's unemployment with consequent loss of political efficacy. We have been
working on the first option for over thirty years, but we refrain to comment on it so as not
to divert the readers’ attention. On this issue, we refer to Baldino (1997) and Baldino and
Carrera (1999).
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Final words
After the 326 pages of Butler, Laclau & Žižek (2000) we arrive at a conclusion: “The
very differential structure of meaning is collapsing, every determination immediately
turns into its opposite” (326). Worse than that - and here is the point where we go one
step ahead of Žižek and say that - every new meaning that we try to produce immediately
reveals itself as having been staged beforehand, waiting for us to play it.
As we tried to show in this paper, good leftist intentions stemming from free will
rapidly invert themselves and end up fueling the juggernaut. We dare one step further and
speculate, beyond Žižek, that not only are our actions reversed against our intentions, but
actually our actions were programmed beforehand waiting for us to undertake them. This
makes sense: the market establishes a demand and waits for someone to undertake the
enterprise. Capital keeps an open door and is just waiting for us to enter it. For the same
feeling, exhibited from an artistic point of view, we refer to Potocki (1995) and Has
(1965).
Therefore, we must conclude that we intend to improve because we are supposed
to enlarge the gap that we are trying to close. We judge with impartiality because we are
supposed to stimulate sadism. We strive for an ultimate mathematical certainty because
we are supposed to fall into faith and contradictions of M20. We declare our freedom of
thought because we are supposed to confirm the effect of the ideological interpellation of
Capital on our qualified-labor-power. In short, we are not only constrained to reproduce
ourselves as meaning and then fade into the level of the unconscious, but, on the contrary,
under the juggernaut of Capital there is no room for the unconscious: it becomes a
fantasy and we become ‘shallow mechanical dolls’.
We must go deeper here. Of course, by submitting this paper we are subject to our
own criticism. Having it accepted, we will be contributing to the circulation of a book as
a commodity, therefore accelerating the juggernaut of Capital: ‘Capital smiles satisfied’.
However, the content of what is published (connecting the overwhelming production of
meaning to terrorism) functions as a logical solution to the capitalism-terrorism
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contradiction15 and might dampen Capital’s smile to some extent. This is as far as we can
go to justify ourselves based on Žižek. However, continuing on this line of reflection
(submitting ourselves to our own criticism) the deep point is the following: according to
the conclusion of the paper, our action of submitting the paper would also be controlled
by the capitalist déjà vu (it would have been planned beforehand16, waiting for us to stage
it). We too have acted as shallow mechanical dolls. Capital’s smile is revitalized. Is there
a way to escape this fate?
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